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Abstract. The role of the human in cyber security is well acknowledged. Many cyber secu-
rity incidents rely upon targets performing specific behavioural actions, such as opening a link 
within a phishing email. Cyber adversaries themselves are driven by psychological processes 
such as motivation, group dynamics and social identity. Furthermore, both intentional and unin-
tentional insider threats are associated with a range of psychological factors, including cognitive 
load, mental wellbeing, trust and interpersonal relations. By incorporating psychology into cyber 
security education, practitioners will be better equipped with the skills they need to address cyber 
security issues. However, there are challenges in doing so. Psychology is a broad discipline, and 
many theories, approaches and methods may have little practical significance to cyber security. 
There is a need to sift through the literature to identify what can be applied to cyber security. 
There are also pedagogical differences in how psychology and cyber security are taught and also 
psychological differences in the types of student that may typically study psychology and cyber 
security. To engage with cyber security students, it is important that these differences are identi-
fied and positively addressed. Essential to this endeavor is the need to discuss and collaborate 
across the two disciplines. In this paper, we explore these issues and discuss our experiences as 
psychology and cyber security academics who work across disciplines to deliver psychology 
education to cyber security students, practitioners and commercial clients.  
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1 Introduction 
Although there is a lack of empirical assessment regarding the cognitive aptitudes, 
communication skills and team-working needed for cyber security professions to be 
effective [1], in this paper we show how we have introduced psychology into cyber 
security programmes to ensure that professionals have an understanding of behavior to 
relate to their domain-specific knowledge and technical skills. Cyber security incidents 
are composed of a sequence of behavioural actions, each of which is determined by a 
range of psychological factors. In many cases cyber adversaries actively attempt to ex-
ploit and manipulate psychological processes of their targets, such as for example 
through the use of phishing emails. This reflects the view of humans as being the weak-
est link in cyber security [2]. However, despite the recognised importance of the human 
element it could be argued that cyber security education and training programs often 
neglect to fully address the psychological components of cyber security. This is despite 
the extensive research literature in psychology that is highly relevant to cyber security 
– understanding motivation, predicting future actions, designing human-centred poli-
cies and interfaces, and changing behaviour and organisational culture. These are topics 
that are taught within psychology programs in colleges and universities across the 
world, as well as within behaviour change and training courses in commerce and in-
dustry. As such there is existing experience pedagogical knowledge on how best to 
educate people about psychology across a range of settings, which could be better uti-
lised for the education of cyber security students and practitioners. 
 
This lack of interdisciplinary approaches to teaching psychology as part of cyber 
security could in part be explained by the nature and typical pedagogical approaches 
used in each discipline.  Psychology is a very broad discipline; ranging from sub-topics 
that are highly reliant on quantitative, technological approaches such as neuropsychol-
ogy, to those which are deeply rooted in qualitative approaches. There is a finite amount 
of time available to deliver any cybersecurity education or training; it would not be 
practical or desirable to deliver a course that includes all the different approaches to 
psychological research. In addition, some of the epistemological and ontological as-
sumptions that are made in psychology differ from those used in cyber security and 
computing. As with other social science subjects many areas of psychology draw upon 
concepts such as social constructionism, which argues that humans create subjective 
interpretations of their social reality. In contrast subjects aligned with technology and 
engineering could be argued to take a more positivist approach, in which there is an 
assumption that there is an objectively correct explanation for any phenomena. When 
educating cyber security students about psychology it is important to have an appreci-
ation of these differences. 
 
  
Drawing upon our own interdisciplinary activities to deliver psychology content as 
part of cyber security education and training programs this paper will explore and dis-
cuss two topics. Firstly, we will identify the areas of psychology that, based on our own 
experiences, is likely to be the most useful and relevant to cyber security students. Sec-
ondly, we will suggest how best to address the ontological and epistemological differ-
ences in approaches that may arise in psychology and cyber security education and 
training activities.  
 
2  Identifying Relevant Areas of Psychology 
 
Psychology is a broad discipline, with many areas of research that could potentially 
be pertinent to a complex and multi-faceted issue such as cyber security. To identify 
areas which are the most important we consider the issue in terms of understanding 
both the cyber adversaries and their targets. 
 
2.1 The adversaries 
A common form of psychological manipulation used by cyber attackers is social 
engineering, exemplified by phishing emails. Whilst the stereotypical phishing email is 
characterized by poor grammar and often crude attempts at manipulation it has been 
noted that these are becoming increasingly sophisticated and persuasive [3], with the 
most convincing tricking users up to 45% of the time [4]. These phishing emails exploit 
the decision-making heuristics – mental short cuts – humans use as a necessity to nav-
igate their complex environments and social worlds. An example of this would be use 
of a company logo within a phishing email in the hope that the recipient will use the 
presence of this an indicator that the email is genuine. Other psychological processes 
relevant to phishing include Protection Motivation Theory [5], in which a fear appeal 
(e.g. a phishing email falsely claiming that a bank account has been hacked) is used to 
motivate a user into taking actions that put themselves at risk. However, not all of the 
processes cited by social engineers are supported by psychological research. For in-
stance neuro-linguistic programming has been listed by some social engineers as an 
effective technique [6], but is largely considered a pseudo-science by psychologists [7]. 
This demonstrates the importance of evidence based, psychologically informed cyber 
security education. 
 
Adversaries’ common psychological patterns may help in recognizing threats. There 
are many forums and website on which individuals discuss cyber security attacks, both 
actual and hypothetical. It has been noted through analysis of these discussions and chat 
logs that cyber adversaries often appear to display cognitive dissonance over their ac-
tions. This refers to the discomfort felt by individuals when they have two contradictory 
beliefs or values. Regardless of how dismissive an individual cyber attacker may be of 
  
their targeted victim they are still likely to feel at least a degree of guilt over causing 
harm to others. Rogers [8] notes that cyber attackers engage in various strategies to 
reduce cognitive dissonance. This includes the use of euphemistic language; blaming 
their actions on social pressures whilst minimizing their own individual roles in group-
based actions; minimizing the negative consequences of their actions; and vilifying and 
dehumanizing their targets. Awareness of these processes may help cyber security prac-
titioners better review possible threats, and also aide them in differentiating an actual, 
imminent threat from idle chat. 
 
Another important area of psychology in relation to cyber adversaries is motivation 
and group identity [30]. Various typologies of adversaries have been proposed, includ-
ing Seebruck’s circular order circumplex model [9], which divides hackers into those 
motivated by prestige, recreation, revenge, profit and ideology. An awareness of these 
varying motivations is important for cybersecurity students, as this will improve their 
understanding of the behavioural patterns and possible future actions on adversaries. 
For example, the motivations and actions of a hacktivist group using a distributed denial 
of service attack to make an ideological protest against an organisation are different 
from those who are financially motivated. This is linked to group processes. It is of 
course often difficult to attribute blame in the case of many cyber security incidents, 
but several of the more high profile cases that have been investigated in depth have 
contained a group element [10, 30]. It is known from social psychological research that 
being part of a group alters an individual’s behaviour and cognition in a number of 
ways, although we are often unaware of the degree to which the membership of the 
group is influencing us [11]. This includes cognitive biases which lead them to overes-
timate the ability of their own group, whilst underestimating the skill level of their op-
ponents, as well as making riskier and more extreme decisions than would be the case 
if the individual acted alone [12]. An awareness that cyber adversaries are acting as a 
group can also be used to inform how best to publicly respond to the attack. As sug-
gested by the category differentiation model [13] an external party identifying a group 
as a group reinforces their sense of group cohesion, which may in turn make further 
actions and attacks more likely Such a processes is argued to have been evident in re-
lation to the hacktivist collective Anonymous, where media reports of their activities 
emboldened the group and reinforced their sense of group identity [10]. By having an 
awareness of these group processes cybersecurity students may again be better placed 
to better predict the future behaviour of cyber adversaries.  
2.2 The Targets 
 
Cyber security attacks that involve a human element often rely upon the target per-
forming, or failing to perform, certain behavioural actions. By examining demographic 
factors and individual differences it may be possible to identify which individuals are 
at particular risk. As has been demonstrated by such research those who are most at risk 
may not match popular stereotypes of vulnerable computer users.  For instance, it has 
been observed that younger adults may be at greater risk at being tricked by phishing 
  
emails, despite their presumed greater familiarity with internet technologies than older 
adults [14]. This is related to the cognitive biases that individual may demonstrate in 
relation to their cyber security behaviors, with for instance individuals being shown to 
ignore warnings about risks if they are confident in their ability to minimize the conse-
quences of a security breach [15]. In addition, there is evidence that people do not 
change their use of social network sites,  even if they have previously been hacked [16]. 
Organisations have also not been found to change their security practices post breach 
or they make only a few modifications with the belief that these changes shield them 
from future attacks [31].  There is little understanding that threat vectors change and 
evolve often becoming more sophisticated and difficult to detect [31]. This may reflect 
the privacy paradox [17], in which individuals are motivated to maintain their reputa-
tion and identity online, even at the cost of taking actions to protect themselves. Further 
cognitive biases include exaggerating unusual risks whilst downplaying more common 
risks; underestimating risks that fall under the individuals remit whilst overestimating 
risks outside their control; perceiving personified risks to be greater than anonymous 
risks; believing themselves to be at less risk than their peers; and finally overestimating 
risks that may become a focus of public discussion [18, 19].  
 
It is important to note that these cognitive biases do serve an evolutionary function. 
As discussed by Kahneman [20], cognitive biases and other forms of decision making 
heuristics are necessary as it would not otherwise be possible for us to process the vast 
amount of information that we are continually encountering. In other words, while ide-
ally we would approach every situation with thorough, comprehensive consideration, 
the cognitive demands of doing so would be too great. Instead, we must make use of 
heuristics and biases to come to quick decisions, often based on relatively limited in-
formation. The tendency of people to do so can easily create frustrations for cyber se-
curity practitioners, who would prefer users to be approaching any situation relating to 
cyber security with the slower, more considered approach. Successful social engineer-
ing strategies are often based on encouraging targets to engage in the quicker form of 
decision making, which is why for instance many phishing emails will include a fear 
appeal or an element or urgency. Many attempts to promote positive cyber security 
behaviors in the workplace aim to encourage users to always be taking the slower, more 
thorough approach to cyber security related activities, rather than making quicker de-
cisions based on a smaller number of cues. Yet psychologists would argue that this is 
not sustainable; and that it is important to accept that the tendency of humans to make 
quick decisions is an evolutionary need, not an inherent design flaw. By better under-
standing how humans make decisions, cyber security practitioners may be better placed 
to determine how to design systems that take these factors into account.    
 
As with cyber adversaries, the individuals who are targeted in cyber-attacks are also 
often part of groups. These social influences need to be acknowledged when consider-
ing cyber security behaviours, that is how group processes may hinder or help when 
cyber security processes and policies are being implemented. For example, as based on 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour it has been noted that the intention someone has to 
perform a desired behaviour (such as updating software) is in part determined by 
  
whether they think influential others will support or condemn their actions [21]. For 
instance, the IT department of a company may direct all staff members to take actions 
to ensure that the software on their PCs is up to date, but if an individual user is con-
cerned that their immediate manager will be unhappy about the downtime this will 
cause then they will be less likely to follow these actions. Social interactions and inter-
personal relationships are also factors relating to insider threat, both intentional and 
unintentional. Band et al [22] identify several relevant factors, including stressful 
events observable in personal and work life, and stressful events in relation to the work-
place, including conflicts and sanctions. These factors are of course highly psycholog-
ical in nature, and making use of pre-existing psychological educational materials could 
help educate cyber security students on how to identify and measure key psychosocial 
factors. 
 
3 Pedagogical Approaches 
 
Successfully incorporating psychology into cyber security education relies not just 
on identify what information should be delivered, but also how it should be delivered. 
It is important to acknowledge that cyber security students and training course attendees 
will often have a certain perception of what psychology entails.  A common perception 
we encounter is that psychology is only concerned with mental illness, and that the 
methods that are used are highly personal and subjective. It can come as a surprise to 
cyber security students that psychology as an academic discipline is far broader, and in 
many countries, will only be offered as a science degree (e.g. a Bachelor of Science in 
the UK, as opposed to a Bachelor of Arts). As discussed in Taylor [23], there are im-
portant differences in ontology and epistemology between psychology and computing-
related disciplines, which shape how students view the world and how receptive they 
may or may not be to different educational approaches. In this section, we will review 
our experiences teaching psychological principles to cyber security students and prac-
titioners across a range of settings. This includes undergraduate and postgraduate 
courses, short courses for continuing professional development and training packages 
for commercial and industrial partners. 
 
3.1 Understanding Student Motivations and Expectations 
 
Students undertaking some form of cyber security education or training can come 
from varied backgrounds, including those entering university or colleges course di-
rectly from school and those who are already working in industry. Differences between 
reasons why students chose computing and psychology degrees has been investigated 
by a number of psychologists. For example, it has been found [24] that computing stu-
dents were primarily interested in developing problem-solving and logical thinking 
  
skills, as well as increasing future earning potential. Psychology students on the other 
hand placed more emphasis on understanding other people, oneself and developing 
greater personal independence. In addition, and perhaps not surprisingly, psychology 
students also expressed greater interest in understanding social relationship and inter-
acting with people, whereas computing students were more interested in understanding 
and interacting with technological systems. It is important to take these differences into 
account when planning and delivering cyber security education and training. This re-
lates not to just to the academic background of the individual, but also their level of 
maturity and life experiences. In our experience younger undergraduate students from 
both psychology and computing backgrounds appear to feel less equipped to discuss 
the moral, ethical and philosophical issues that arise in cyber security. Gibb et al ob-
serve that undergraduates’ may not have yet fully developed their understanding of how 
moral issues relate to societal functioning [25]. Therefore, cyber security education may 
need to be tailored towards the student population to whom the material is being deliv-
ered.  
 
It is also important to recognize that students studying for cybersecurity courses are 
likely to have been taught in different ways and may approach studying in different 
ways, compared to those studying for psychology degrees. On the one hand, based on 
our own experience computing assignments tend to require answers that are unequivo-
cally right or wrong, or at least where there is finite set of correct solutions. Within 
psychology, on the other hand, the emphasis can often be on the quality of the debate 
that is put forward by the student, with there often being no correct answer. This is not 
of course the case with all areas of psychology – in some sub-disciplines such as neu-
ropsychology for instance there is a clearer sense of information being either right or 
wrong, which is in keeping with such sub-disciplines being considered more ‘scientific’ 
than other areas of psychology. Nevertheless, we would argue that there is a greater 
emphasis in psychology on an objective evaluation of theories, whereas assignment in 
computing tend to have a more problem-solving focus, which solutions or answers 
deemed to be either correct or incorrect.  Depending on their background it has also 
been our experience that cybersecurity students can find the methodological approaches 
used in psychology to be quite different from what they have previously experienced. 
An experience we often have when we presented multiple (occasionally contradictory) 
theories to cyber security students is to be asked which theory is the correct one – they 
are then often surprised, and at times frustrated, when we reply there is no single, uni-
versally accepted theory which is seen as the correct one. 
 
3.2 Perspective Shifting 
 
It has been our experience that cyber security students tend to focus on how the 
actions of the target enabled or facilitated the cyber-attack. However, in our expe-
rience it seems that while students are interested in the how and the what, they are 
less interested in the why. Similarly, cyber adversaries tend not to be considered, 
  
beyond an analysis of what their actions were. In the sessions we have delivered 
with cyber security students we have attempted to promote a deeper understanding 
of the psychological processes displayed by both the targets and the cyber adver-
saries. One way we do this is by asking the students to consider the incident from 
the perspective of both parties. For example, students are asked to identify high 
risk group and to consider how advice should be tailored to that group so that it 
will be understood and acted upon. They are then asked to design a cyberattack 
that would circumnavigate their own advice, again taking into account the psycho-
logical characteristics of the target group. In doing so students are encouraged to 
think about the various psychological processes discussed in Section 2, and to de-
velop a deeper understanding of why adversaries may have chosen a target, why 
they chose a particular attack methodology and why the targets may have failed to 
identify and mitigate the attack.  
 
Another instance where we extended a two-way relationship between psychology 
and cyber security is during the teaching of digital investigations and forensics. 
The processes of cyber forensic analysis function in a complex problem space, due 
to the increased uncertainty surrounding forensics investigations in general. Since 
digital investigations refer to an activity related to an individual or a group of cyber 
criminals, an understanding of psychology plays a significant role. For example, if 
when deciphering the evidence files an exhaustive search becomes the final option 
(due to failure of all cryptanalytic attacks), the data would need to be decrypted 
based on constructing case-specific dictionaries according to the psychology of the 
suspect’s behaviour. In such cases, behavioural profiling is used to identify certain 
traits, preferences or tastes of the suspect that can assist in constructing a collection 
of dictionaries of passwords. These shifts to employing psychological perspectives 
in the analysis of digital evidence also contributes to the understanding of the so-
cio-psychological behaviour of cyber criminals. Moreover, it was found that inte-
grating psychology and digital investigations and forensics on an epistemological 
level not only resulted in added value for the cyber security students, but also of 
paramount importance that cyber security involves psychology in order to com-
pensate for the significant uncertainty that governs the analysis of cybercrime. 
 
Finally, cyber security students—and their professional counterparts—often ap-
proach cyber security concerns with the addition of new systems; adding authenti-
cation requirements, password requirements, policies, and permissions restrictions. 
But these approaches often add complexity to an already complex operations eco-
system, make the work of the employees more arduous, and rarely patch the true 
causes of the security gaps. The types of evidence-based design principles offered 
by the user-design field of psychology helps cyber security students better under-
stand the need for usable security systems—systems that improve security and re-
duce potential loss where employees do not feel overburdened—and how to im-
plement them. Usually, the goal is clarity for the user, but user design can also be 
used to add desirable difficulties for end-users [26]. Desirable difficulties, or a 
marker that breaks up the flow of current activities, can be used as a tool for in-
creasing awareness at key times [27]. Teaching cyber security students about usa-
ble design, and more specifically usable security, allows them to consider new ap-
proaches to cyber security that account for the ways in which their staff will inter-
act with the systems they create. 
 
  
 
3. Teaching Psychology in the Workplace 
 
Many of the learning outcomes emerging from teaching psychology and cybersecu-
rity are now being used as the basis for commercial tools that can be used to address 
cyber security practice within organization. However, there are important differences 
in context between a college and university course and the work place. Cyber security 
students may be skeptical about the role of psychology, but it is reasonable to assume 
that they do at least have an interest in cyber security overall. As such the main chal-
lenge is to demonstrate to them why psychology is an important topic in relation to 
cyber security. In organisations however, users may not have initial interest in cyber 
security at all. Even if they do there may be greater pressures of time and money within 
a workplace, that mean that cyber security education has to be delivered in a much 
shorter time scale. The academic authors of this paper have explored these challenges 
in conjunction with practitioners. 
 
In the UK, we have worked with LiMETOOLS, a highly specialised publisher of 
learning tools that bring about behavioural change in areas of high commercial risk 
management, including cyber security. Making use of social cognitive learning theory 
[28] employees are prompted to consider how behavioural actions may lead to and fa-
cilitate cyber security attacks way similar to the perspective taking exercises used with 
students. Interactive dramas are used immerse learners in examples of realistic cyber 
security incidents, followed by interactive quizzes to assess knowledge. A tool targeted 
at graduate workers who used social networks heavily has also been created. As such 
rather than attempting to cover the full range of possible cyber security risks the tool 
focuses on a key area that is often utilized by social engineers. The tool exposes a fic-
tional hacker at work, whilst facilitating the learner through a process creating their 
own action plan. On the basis that prevention is better than cure a second tool offers 
graduate recruiters an audit tool for new potential employees to calculate their vulner-
ability in the cyber domains relevant to a wide range of industrial sectors. As such the 
tool both educates and audits at the same time. 
 
Further prevailing methods used by organisations in Australia involving psychology 
to address cyber security risks are centered on HATCH Training (Hacking and Tricking 
Capricious Humans) using real time scenarios to help employees learn different cyber-
attack situations and the processes to tackle them. This method particularly has been 
found effective in reducing phishing, ransomware, physical manipulations, and spear 
phishing related attacks. In addition, simulation-based training using gamification tools 
where live examples are presented along with solutions is now commonly applied by 
large organisations. The gamification aspects of the training are focused on assessing 
the behaviour of hypothetical victims of cyber-attacks through psychological manipu-
lations. This was observed to have a major impact on increasing the level of cyber se-
curity risks awareness among employees. Besides, some well-resourced organisations 
  
now find it crucial to apply psychology to boost cyber security by targeting specific 
behavioural limitations such as cultural influence, biases, and cognitive preferences to 
identify noncompliant security behaviour of employees, as well as employees that are 
overestimating their capability to mitigate security risks. This strategy creates the pos-
sibility for organisations to design role-specific interventions for any identified weak 
points.     
 
The key learning outcomes of these trials so far indicate six critical requirements for 
this kind of workplace learning that combines psychology and cyber security factors: 
i) the immersive aspect of the approach through videos and dramatizations appear to 
be particularly effective with younger learners, who appear to be more easily distracted 
when less immersive teaching strategies are used; 
ii) integrating well-executed and psychologically backed game design with intellec-
tual challenges, and positive reinforcement techniques improves learner’s engagement, 
thus, promoting behaviour change and knowledge retention; 
iii) learners demonstrated the wish to have control over their pace of learning and 
also the device on which they engage with the educational materials; this is consistent 
with psychological research that would suggest that giving people a feeling of control 
over their own behaviour change process is likely to improve outcomes [29]; 
iv) it is important to find a balance between the activities. Users respond best when 
there is a combination of videos, quizzes and interactive sessions. Users who did appear 
to find any one particular activity too extensive were observed to attempt to cheat the 
system to move to the next activity; 
v) raising awareness is not by itself sufficient. Indeed, several users noted that after 
viewing the video materials they felt more nervous and uncertain than before about how 
to respond to cyber security threats. This relates to the aforementioned Protection Mo-
tivation Theory [16], in which individuals who are too afraid of a possible threat may 
not even attempt to avoid the threat, if they believe that such avoidance is not possible. 
The developer mitigates this risk by following up the input experience immediately 
with a module that supports the user in producing their own positive action plan to 
minimise the risk; and 
vi) learners need to know how they are performing at regular intervals during the 
experience. The developer’s Learning Management Software (LMS) is configured so 
that the learner can see their scores regularly and receive comparative data about their 
performance against the rest of their peer group. This can incentivise the enthusiasm 
for learning by itself.  
 
4 Conclusions 
 
We strongly believe that there is potential for the field of psychology to contribute 
to cyber security education and practice. To do so we need to consider which areas of 
psychological research are most pertinent to cyber security, whilst taking a pragmatic 
  
approach that acknowledges the time and resources available when delivering cyber 
security education and training. We also need to acknowledge the differences in epis-
temological and ontological assumptions between psychology and cyber security stu-
dents, and how these translate into teaching practice. By doing so we can work in an 
inter-disciplinary manner to better equip cyber security students and practitioners with 
the skills and knowledge they need to address cyber security challenges.  
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